Improving Iran-Western ties in the absence of JCPOA is important: Professor

The professor at George mason university, Edward Rhodes, said in an exclusive interview with ILNA that the war in Ukraine from the perspective of Western nations profoundly changed the entire international landscape. 

“The thinking of Western nations -- both by ordinary people and by governments -- had increasingly rested on the presumption that deliberate, unprovoked military aggression by a major power against a smaller neighbor, with the aim of changing sovereign borders, was a thing of the past.  The Ukraine war shattered that notion, perhaps even more in Europe, where such views were most deeply held, than in America.”

“Put differently, the dominant assumption shaping the foreign policies of the major nations in the West had been that the world -- or at least the Western and Euro-centric portion of the world -- was moving steadily toward a system of politics in which disputes would be settled through institutions other than war, and in which cooperation would dominate over conflict.  This belief rested on two notions:  first, that liberal democracy would gradually but inevitably dominate over other political systems and, second, that liberal democracies would naturally develop international political institutions that would render war anachronistic.  In this view, the role of military force was moving to an ever-smaller sphere, playing a role only, on the one hand, between liberal democracies and states that were not yet liberal democracies and, on the other hand, between liberal democracies and non-Western states that were pursuing an ultimate goal of some system other than liberal democracy.  Even in the latter case, the presumption was that, however slowly, progress would inevitably be made in finding solutions that would render the war unnecessary,” he added.

He continued that existing approaches to foreign policy have, to a remarkable degree, been abandoned overnight.  Perhaps the clearest example of this can be found in Germany's decision to engage in substantial military rearmament -- something that would have been unthinkable six months ago.

He said that if the war itself were not enough, the way Russia has waged the war has also raised serious doubts about old assumptions. 

“It was always understood that war would inevitably inflict some harm on ordinary civilians.  War would disrupt the functioning of economies and destroy elements in the physical infrastructure that was critical to the functioning of civilian society.  And even if honest, serious efforts were made to avoid "collateral damage," and even if honest, serious efforts were made to use modern technology to fight a war "surgically," it was recognized that some civilians would inevitably be killed or wounded in a modern military conflict.  As always, too, it was understood that, in uncontrolled anger or by psychotic individuals, some war crimes would happen.  No one thought that war could be waged in some perfectly "clean" way.”

He underlined that accepted norms of war have been violated not simply accidentally, occasionally, or by criminal actors in the military, but as a basic element in the war plan...

“The simple but not necessarily helpful answer to the question, "has the Russian-Ukrainian war affected the talks," is that the Russian-Ukrainian war has affected everything.  The invasion of Ukraine has triggered a fundamental re-examination of foreign policy equivalent to the one that occurred after 9/11.”

Commenting on a question about the interruption in the negotiations, he said, “My expectation is that the pause in negotiations will continue until there is more clarity about the meaning and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war.  I think there will be at least two reasons for a protracted pause if one does in fact occur.  First, the focus of Western foreign policy decision-makers and of the Western public is so firmly fixed on events in Ukraine that -- absent some disaster, such as the outbreak of war between Iran and one of its neighbors -- there simply will not be enough mental band-width to think about anything else.”

“Second, while Westerners are struggling to try to make sense of their world, they will find it difficult to figure out how to evaluate their conflicting hopes and fears regarding the Islamic world.  How much do we fear the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran -- given the chain of uncontrollable military consequences we expect that acquisition would provoke in Iranian-Arab, Shia-Sunni, and Islamic-Israeli relations?  How strongly do we want to see Iran restored to full membership in the global economic community? “ he added.

“None of these questions have clear answers -- though, for better or for worse, some actions by the Iranian government might help provide at least temporary clarity.  Iran will, of course, need to decide for itself what its interests are in this changed international situation.  Were it, however, to provide diplomatic support for Russia, this would be likely to convince many in the West that there is no reasonable prospect for improvement in Iranian-Western relations and it would lend substantial support to hard-core opponents of any agreement.  Conversely, were Iran to take a position consistent with the one being taken by Western governments -- that the Russian war in Ukraine represents an unacceptable breach of international norms -- then the current Russian-Ukrainian war might in fact open the door to improved Western-Iranian relations.  Frankly, no one in Washington thinks that the United States has any leverage with Iran over Iranian-Russian relations or Iranian-Chinese relations at the present time.  The view is that Iran will decide where it stands, and the West will factor this into its emerging vision of world politics.”

He said that the general assumption in Washington is that at some point there will in fact be a resumption of the JCPOA talks.  What is completely unclear to anyone in Washington, however, is whether this resumption will occur because each side simply wants to demonstrate that it was not the side responsible for the breakdown in negotiations, or because there is a perception that, in the new situation, there is an improved prospect for improving Western-Iranian relations.

Responding to a question about is agreement still possible, he said, “I continue to be pessimistic about the ability of the parties to agree to a return to the JCPOA.  I hope they can.  But I think that the inability of either party to irreversibly commit itself makes an agreement unlikely.  Whatever the U.S. agrees to, Iran knows that at some future date the United States could reimpose sanctions.  Whatever Iran agrees to, the United States knows that at some future date Iran could rapidly resume progress toward a nuclear breakthrough. Any agreement would thus require an extraordinary level of trust (or otherwise would simply reflect an extraordinary level of cynicism).  Given the history of Iranian-West relations, and given the number of disagreements between the West and Iran over regional issues, it seems unlikely that this level of trust will suddenly emerge.”

He said that what seems important to me, however, is finding ways to improve Iranian-Western relations in the absence of a return to the JCPOA.  “In the absence of a return to the JCPOA, are there ways to reduce the likelihood of war between Israel and Iran, or between Iran and some of its Arab neighbors?  In the absence of a return to the JCPOA, are there ways to begin to reintegrate Iran into world markets and to reduce the level of conflict between the West and Iran over Iranian regional policies?”

“My two pieces of advice to negotiators would be, first, to understand that these negotiations are now overshadowed by the breakdown in trust and relations between the West and Russia and, second, to avoid viewing the current negotiations as ones in which the outcome will be the JCPOA or nothing.”

He concluded that whether or not it is possible to get back to the JCPOA, it is in no one's interests that war between Iran and any of its neighbors break out, or that ongoing civil wars in the region continue, or that the Iranian people continue to suffer. “Are there understandings that can reduce the likelihood of these outcomes?  Particularly as we look at the human costs of war in Ukraine, we can hope that negotiators can find creative steps forward, however partial, to avoid further human calamities of this sort.”